In our contribution for COLING 88 (1III '88), we introduced the concept of dialogical failure in the framework of dialogue games, by defining rules for the operator F, where FA is to be interpreted as "A is not winnable in this stage of the dialogue". We showed that F can be employed in the formulation of provisional implications. Provisional implications can be considered as the dialogical interpretation of defaults.It was shown that our solution works well for a range of examples. We concluded our paper with the announcement of a treatment of counteffactuals in terms of dialogical failure and of an implemented theorernprover for conditionals and counteffactuals based on our theoretical developments.In this note we will briefly describe the considerations: leading to our treatment of counteffactuals and introduce the implementation of a theoremprover for conditionals as a subsystem of PROLOG. For a more detailed description of the formal properties of the system we refer to (ttli.91).
I. A DOUBLE CIIANGE OF LOGICAL ROLES
1. If it were the case that A, then it would be the case that C is usually called a counteffactual, because its antecedent is pretended not to have tile truth-value it "rcally" has. Tichy (T.84) shows that none of the prominent theories on counteffactuals is successfull on all members of a set of mostly very plausible testeases, and wonders why it is, that in settling the validity of a counterctual, nobody ever refers to such matters as world similarity and other well known paraphernalia of traditional counteffactual theory. We take seriously Tichy's suggestion to look for the use of counteffactuals and formulate a semantics for counteffactuals not in terms of "troth" and "falsehood", but rather in terms of what is done and not done in a dialogue in which a counterfactual appears. One thing which simply is qmt done" when discussing a eounterfactual is the following: Suppose you forward the thesis "if kangaroos had no tails, they would topple over" (I.73) to somebody who has already admitted that kangaroos do have tails. Suppose your adversary accepts the invitation to discuss, and takes the antecedent of the counterfactual as a temporary additional concession. Then it would be completely out of order Ibr you to claim to have won the the discussion on the ground that your adversary has now "contradicted" himself.tlowever, if contradicting oneself -as an opponent -in a discussion is no longer a reason for losing that discussion, then we seem to be playing according to roles which are similar to those for minimal calculus. Define negation as implication of some absurd statement, eg. a contradiction, "%":
In intuitionistic and in classical logic the proponent who utters the absurd statement loses against any thesis whatsoever. Not so in minimal calculus: here the opponent, having uttered the absurd, loses only if he, in a later move, attacks the absurd brought forward by the proponent. However, counteffaetuals cannot simply be treated as implications in minimal calculus: Suppose Jones steps on the brake (B), and is "alive (A), and that is all we assume or admit. We will not accept the counteffactual "If Jones would not step on the brake, then he would not be alive" as winnable (i.e. holding) under these circumstances. But in minimal calculus we have 3. A,B?
--B-> -~A = yes min Suppose we add to tile concessions A and B a concession to the effect that stepping on tile brake is the only reason for Jones' being alive (--, B -> -, A). Now we will not want the counteffactual "If Jones would not step on tile brake, then he would be alive" ( -1 B -> A ) to be whmable. But it is, since in minimal calculus we have 4. Q,C? A-> C = yes rain
In lhe usual minimal games the Ol)pOl)cIll , having admitted (2 has no opportunity to briug at U addi-+ tional reasons into play which would allow him to retract C afler accepting the anleccdcnt A. Wc therelbre need two things: a treatment of negation which is even weaker than that of minimal calculus,and the introduction of an opportuuity for the opponent to make us(" of his own conccssiot~s as exception rules+ The second of these is easily etlk'ctuated: by inlroducing flK+ fail-operator twice we cause a first change of rolcs which gives the opponent, tmw as a ternporary proponent, the op+ portunity to britlg additional concessions into play, The second fail operator then restores the initial order of roles. What we get is
5.1;(A ~. > I;((;))
()ur counterlhctual becomes,intuitively, "You,the opponent,will fail in showing that C fails, aftcr A has been added to the concessions".
WI:,AKliNING Nt//)ATION
We obtain a system with negation which is weaker than minimal calculus negation, by assuming that there is not just one absurd statement, but possibly infinitely many. l)efinition 2. implicitly considers the absurd as a function taldng formulae A to fo> mulac %(A) under the assumplion that %(A) -%(B) for any A and 13. If wc drop this assumption, which is actually a very strong one, we get a family of logics, for which the only axiom governing negation i'; and brings us back to minimal calculus. Our final analysis of counteffactual implications "if it were the case that A, then it would be the case that B" 1lOW is 8. F (A-> I r 13) kin kin where the subscript "kir(' refers to the fact that the checking dialogues induced by the fail operator, are conducted according to the/'ules of classical games, but for the fhct that negation is handled by the rules R)r most minimal calculus. We will demonstrate that lhis :[brmalization leads to satisfactory results on all of the examples presented in (T.84).
IMIU,IiMI:,N'I'ATION 1N Pl~.()l,O(~
The prover is implemelded as a I>ROI ,()(} subsystem. One distinguishes between lhe syntax of the data in the dalabasc, and the s) lHax of qttcries +is in PR()I,()(}. As for data, the propram acceF, ts [acts and rttles. Apar| from the, usual operators ",] and ";", lhere ;.lle "lieS" t'()r ne~,ation, " .: +~ " !br pro@. sional, non-monotonic implication, "< +" i0r ordi+ nary PP, OI,OG implication and "= >" ff~r the cotmterthctual.For atomic statements the program accepts standard Iq<OL()(} syntax. 'I'hey can also be built ins, which have to be declared i,~ order to bc accessible to the recta-interpreter. 'lhe rectainterpreter is called by %ucccss/l" and %uccess/2". success/l takes a query, success/2 lal<es a query as first argument and a list of additional facts which can be used in the proof in addition to the facts in the database. 
